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Formal Neutrality in the Warren and
Rehnquist Courts: Illusions of
Similarity
Rebecca L. Brown*
I read recently that if one compares the genetic structure of
humans to that of dogs, one finds that ninety-six percent of the DNA
in the two species is identical. That is a lot of common ground. Yet it
may not be enough to draw meaningful conclusions about the same-
ness of the two creatures. Without suggesting that either of the two
Courts discussed in her Article is a "dog," I do think it is fair to say
that Professor Sherry has perhaps underestimated the relative
importance of the divergent four percent.
Professor Sherry argues that in the defining areas of racial
equality and freedom of speech, the Warren Court and the Rehnquist
Court have adhered to identical views about the meaning of the
Constitution. They have developed and consistently applied the same
informing principle governing a state's obligation with regard to
treatment of the individual. That commonly recognized principle is
formal neutrality.1 By requiring a state to remain neutral as between
races and viewpoints, both Courts have embraced a common philoso-
phy that renders them equally liberal or equally conservative,
Professor Sherry contends. It is wrong, therefore, for the academy to
revere the Warren Court as liberal and condemn the Rehnquist Court
as conservative, in light of their equal recognition of the appropriate
equality principle. She goes on to explain why the legal academy
insists on these unfair characterizations despite what she calls the
"obvious" identity between the two bodies of case law.
2
In this Comment, I do not have occasion to consider the ques-
tion of why the academy might persist in perpetuating an illusory
distinction between the Warren and Rehnquist Courts. Instead, I
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I am grateful to Barry Friedman, Stephen
Gardbaum, John Goldberg, and Bob Rasmussen for their help.
1. Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know It Learned from the
Warren Court, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 459, 477 (1997).
2. Id. at 475-76.
487
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
intend to show that it is the asserted identity, rather than dichotomy,
between the two Courts that is illusory. The claimed similarity be-
tween the jurisprudence of the Warren Court and that of the current
Court can be drawn only at the expense of giving full recognition to
the deep ideological commitments of both Courts. The characteriza-
tion of both Courts as endorsing formal neutrality overlooks the pow-
erful philosophical leanings of both Courts and their respective places
in prevailing political theory. Once considered in context, the deci-
sions of the two Courts make clear that a theory of identity between
them shares a common flaw with the canine/human equation: even if
superficially plausible, it utterly fails to account for the soul.
Professor Sherry has identified neutrality-defined to mean a
state's obligation to treat all races with equal solicitude and all views
with equal tolerance-as the touchstone of a liberal, enlightened
society.3 But the role of state neutrality in liberal political theory is
itself a contestable and complex question. By turning to a more de-
tailed examination of neutrality as a liberal precept, I hope to show
that Professor Sherry has confounded two separate schools of liberal
thought and has thus reached some inappropriate conclusions about
the two Courts' places in these schools of thought. This analysis leads
me to conclude that the two Courts have less in common than
Professor Sherry suggests and in fact hold to such different views of
racial justice as to warrant fully the dichotomous labels they have
received.
I.
To identify a decisionmaker as "liberal" is not necessarily to
describe that person's political views with any degree of precision.
Just as the term "conservative" can carry at least four different mean-
ings, 4 the term "liberal" as applied to a judge or group of judges also
denotes many possible types of philosophical commitments. The truth
of what liberalism requires is itself the topic of heated and longstand-
ing debate not only among legal academics but also among political
theorists and philosophers. In this Comment, I can only touch on the
broadest themes that characterize this debate.
3. Id. at 477-79.
4. See John C.P. Goldberg, On the Merits: A Response to Professor Sherry, 50 Vand. L.
Rev. 537, 540 (1997).
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Two major strands of liberal political theory provide fodder for
much theoretical discussion today.5 One strain of liberalism is termed
"political liberalism." This school is committed to ensuring that a
state does not privilege any of the competing moral ideals of its
citizens about the meaning of the good life; its core value is neutral-
ity.6 In terms of justifying its actions, a state must remain neutral as
between all points of view and as between possible substantive out-
comes. For the political liberal, no moral value-even that of toler-
ance of diverse moral views-can be promoted or endorsed by the
state. This conviction rests on the premise that because there is no
single principle or ideal that can command universal belief, justice
requires that none of them be privileged by the basic political institu-
tions of society. 7 Thus, no controversial ideal of the good life will be
called upon to justify the fundamental political principles under
which all must live.8 The label "political" granted this strain of liber-
alism refers to the instinct that the institutions of govern-
ment-society's political institutions-have no place choosing among
competing visions of the good life for their citizens. To the political
liberal, the government may not adopt or endorse visions of society
that privilege one group over another, and even in the interest of
some perceived societal good it may not enact laws that give prefer-
ence to particular racial groups. Neutrality is a required posture for
government, controlling both the ends of government and the means
it chooses to achieve them.
The contrasting, and more traditional, form of liberalism is
known as "comprehensive liberalism." Its name, "comprehensive,"
refers to the fact that it envisions liberalism as incorporating a par-
ticular conception of the good that is not limited to the political
sphere.9 Its central objective is to identify how a state can facilitate
the moral lives of its citizens and thus contribute to their fulfillment
as human beings.10 The state's proper role is not merely to leave
citizens as it finds them to work out their lives for themselves.
5. The summary that constitutes Part I draws heavily on an excellent exposition of the
philosophical schools and the implications of their differences in Stephen A. Gardbaum,
Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 385 (1996). I have benefited from
Professor Gardbaum's lucid and extremely helpful bridge between political theory and law.
6. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 110 (Clarendon Press, 1986).
7. Charles E. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity 43-44 (Cambridge U., 1987).
8. Id. at 69.
9. See Gardbaum, 48 Stan. L. Rev. at 386 n.3 (cited in note 5).
10. See generally Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals
After All, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1350 (1991).
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Instead, the state has an affirmative obligation to promote human
flourishing, which inevitably involves the state in endorsing some
substantive values.
According to many comprehensive liberals, the particular
moral ideal that is constitutive of liberalism is individual autonomy."
The idea is that by giving people real choices, allowing them to be
part-authors of the text that is their lives, the state does the best it
can to promote human flourishing, which is its highest calling.
Comprehensive liberals are generally not concerned with what choices
people actually make, as long as the choices themselves are uncoerced
by design and circumstance. In privileging this ideal of auton-
omy-an unapologetically substantive value-the state will often find
it necessary to remain neutral. This need arises not because neutral-
ity is itself an objective, but because in many cases state neutrality
promotes autonomy by increasing freedom of choice for citizens. For
example, if the state stays out of all religious discourse, citizens will
generally have an unconstrained choice about their own religious
preferences. This approach would satisfy political and comprehensive
liberals alike.
For comprehensive liberals, however, it may sometimes be-
come necessary for the state to promote certain ways of life rather
than others, always in the interest of autonomy as the greatest moral
good. For example, if one particularly intolerant religion became so
dominant in the private sector that people of other religions were
subjected to discrimination in employment, housing, and private so-
cial institutions, the comprehensive liberal might determine that the
state had an obligation to use government vehicles to open the doors
of opportunity for the minority religious groups. 12 For this reason,
political and comprehensive liberalism are not merely two means to
the same end of state neutrality. They seek different ends: the main-
tenance of strict political neutrality in the one case and the
maximization of autonomy in the other.
The adoption of autonomy as the goal of the state flows from
the origins of Western liberalism itself. Liberalism rejected the once-
dominant world view that assigned individuals, by birth, to roles in
life that placed them permanently in some immutable position in a
hierarchical pQlitical society. The liberal innovation saw political
society as artificially constructed rather than natural, and therefore
insisted that it be justified. It posited a premise of natural equality
11. See Raz, The Morality Of Freedom at 369 (cited in note 6).
12. This example ignores any influence of the First Amendment.
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rather than natural hierarchy and viewed individuals as having some
control over their own roles in life. The meaningful accommodation of
autonomy and individual choice is a logical outgrowth of this rejection
of the hierarchical order and new emphasis on freedom.
The problem, and the area in which comprehensive liberals
and political liberals must diverge, arises when it becomes apparent
that merely remaining neutral among competing ways of life will not
ensure the attainment of individual autonomy for some citizens.
When faced with this dilemma, the political liberal must sacrifice
autonomy for the sake of neutrality; the comprehensive liberal will, if
necessary, sacrifice neutrality for the sake of autonomy. 13 State coer-
cion of individual choice would offend both liberal schools by under-
mining both autonomy and neutrality. But the comprehensive liberal
goes further than simply condemning coercion. The comprehensive
liberal claims that just as the state has the unique ability and duty to
protect life, liberty, and property against dangers posed by other
individuals, so too it may have an obligation to counter constraints on
autonomy generated by private elements of society. It must guaran-
tee individuals an adequate range of genuine options and the means
to choose among them. Economic, educational, and informational
barriers to meaningful choice may require positive state action to
ensure the protection of autonomy. Such action violates the political-
liberal value of state neutrality.
II.
This core distinction between the two schools of liberal
thought, I suggest, is the key to the comparison between the Warren
and Rehnquist Courts. I would like to look briefly at some of the
Warren Court cases that Professor Sherry offers as examples of a
judicial commitment to enforcing state neutrality and suggest a dif-
ferent way of reading them.
First is Brown v. Board of Education.14 There, it is true, the
Court declared, as Professor Sherry quoted, that education "must be
13. This is why Professor Sherry's suggestion that she is concerned only with means,
Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 479-80 (cited in note 1), misses the point I am making here.
Adherents of the autonomy-promoting school of liberal thought (a group that I argue includes
the members of the Warren Court) would not agree with Professor Sherry that the state's quest
to promote individual autonomy should be limited by principles of colorblindness.
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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made available to all on equal terms."1 But that statement comes
only at the conclusion of a paragraph that suggests quite a more com-
plex motivation:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.... It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening a child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.
16
The Court's explanation of its reasoning could have been lifted from
any one of the many liberal writings, starting with Adam Smith, that
discuss the vital role of public education in enhancing individual
autonomy. 7 Thus, while the Court's ultimate holding-invalidating
racial segregation in public schools-could be read as evidence of a
commitment to state neutrality between the races, its extensive dis-
cussion of the nature of the benefit denied (education) reinforces the
view that this opinion was motivated by the autonomy-promoting
strand of liberal thought at least as much as by the neutrality strand.
The Court was clearly concerned that the segregating state was deny-
ing a group of its citizens the means to make thie fundamental life
choices that form the core of personal autonomy and fulfillment.
Undeniably, the Court's concern about the disadvantages that accom-
pany an inferior education was certainly heightened by the fact that a
long-oppressed racial group bore the burden of the system. But the
case does not suggest that the only or even the dominant principle at
work was an aspiration for colorblindness as a means or an end of
state action. 8
Similarly in Loving v. Virginia,19 the interracial marriage case,
it is hard to see how the Court's decision invalidating the state ban
can be understood to endorse Professor Sherry's view of neutrality.
Under her characterization, the neutrality principle means that "the
15. Id. at 493.
16. Id.
17. See Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy
13-23 (U. of Chicago, 1995). See also Gardbaum, 48 Stan. L. Rev. at 402-03 n.64 (cited in note
5).
18. To the contrary, the Court expressed concern that segregation "generates a feeling of
inferiority as to [blacks'] status in the community." 347 U.S. at 494.
19. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not depend-
ent on the race of those burdened or benefited by the particular classi-
fication."20 That is, the state must treat people of one race the same
as those of another, irrespective of other factors. In Loving, the stat-
ute made it equally criminal for any member of one race to marry
someone of another race. Before the Court, the state argued that this
represented exactly the kind of evenhanded treatment that Justice
O'Connor's later definition, adopted by Professor Sherry, appears to
envision-equal burdens on all races.21 Indeed, because of the nature
of this particular offense (it takes two to miscegenate), any violation
by a member of one race would necessarily be accompanied by an
equal violation by a member of another, and both offenders would be
equally susceptible to punishment under the terms of the statute.
But the Court did not for a moment appear to consider that
racial evenhandedness sufficient to save a measure so deeply offen-
sive to individual choice in a matter of such acute personal impor-
tance. It seems to me that a Court committed only to Professor
Sherry's principle of racial neutrality would be hard pressed to strike
down the miscegenation statute in Loving. Far from supporting the
neutrality principle, the Loving case suggests quite persuasively that
something other than an insistence on state neutrality is at work in
the analysis.22 There are of course snippets of language in the Court's
opinion decrying "arbitrary and invidious discrimination."23 But the
Court's analysis of the role of race-why this statute is invidious
discrimination-is quite unresponsive to the claim of evenhanded-
ness. The clearest statement of the Court's reasoning is perhaps that
"the freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
20. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 477 (cited in note 1) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)). See also Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
21. Loving, 388 U.S. at 5.
22. Professor Sherry does not suggest, but perhaps it could be argued, that the failure of
neutrality in the statute at issue in Loving lay in the state's insistence that individuals treat
the races differently: each private person was required, in essence, to discriminate on the basis
of race in the selection of a spouse. Still, howevei, such an interpretation would suggest not
that the state had run afoul of the formal neutrality principle, but rather that the societal ideal
of colorblindness as a way of life had been compromised. This would offend neutrality only if
one understood formal neutrality to promote an end state of societal colorblindness as opposed
to calling for colorblind legislative means of getting there. For reasons discussed by Professor
Goldberg, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 552 (cited in note 4), I do not think that understanding of formal
neutrality (which is not really formal at all) is the one Professor Sherry adopts. Rather, I
believe Professor Sherry intends formal neutrality to indicate evenhandedness by the state in
its legislation. That is also the sense in which I am using the term.
23. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10.
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men."24 That, of course, is a statement of commitment to state-pro-
tected autonomy. Thus, a highly plausible interpretation of the
Loving case is that the Court was unwilling to legitimate a measure
so grossly antagonistic to the pursuit of individual autonomy.
Other Warren Court decisions perhaps demonstrate even more
clearly its commitment to the values of comprehensive liberalism.
Wisconsin v. Yoder 25 exemplifies the type of case that would divide the
comprehensive liberal from the political liberal. Yoder involved a
mandatory school attendance law in the state of Wisconsin. There is
nothing non-neutral about this requirement; it provides, simply, that
every child of a specified age must go to school. In our society, man-
datory schooling is generally not a contested value. I believe that a
political liberal would uphold such a law as applicable equally to all,
neither facially nor designedly discriminatory with regard to any
group or belief system. But the Amish plaintiffs in Yoder claimed
that exposing their children to the worldly values that they would
encounter in public high schools would threaten their commitment to
"wisdom, rather than technical knowledge; community welfare, rather
than competition; and separation from.., contemporary worldly
society."26 The Court indicated that for people of the Amish faith
going to school would be a violation of a religious tenet and therefore
a transgression of the First Amendment.27 The case is not known only
for its contribution to free exercise jurisprudence, however, because
much of the thrust of the facts and of the Court's analysis lay else-
where.
What concerned the Court about the statute in Yoder was that
the state was interfering with the independent judgment of the Amish
students and their parents in making fundamental life choices.28 That
is why the decision is routinely included as one of the cases
24. Id. at 12.
25. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
26. Id. at 211.
27. Id. at 234-35.
28. Id. at 218. ("The conclusion is inescapable that secondary schooling ... expose [s]
Amish children to worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals and values contrary to beliefs,
and... substantially interfer[es] with the religious development of the Amish child and his
integration into the way of life of the Amish faith community."). While not strictly still the
'Warren" Court, since Chief Justice Earl Warren had retired by the time the case was decided,
Yoder can still be considered a product of the same philosophical commitments. Furthermore,
the majority opinion was joined by all of the members of the Warren Court except Justice
Douglas. Justice Douglas dissented in part on a ground suggesting that he felt the Court had
not given enough deference to the importance of autonomy. His criticism was that the Court
had taken account of the interests of the state and the Amish parents, but had not adequately
considered the perhaps independent interests of the Amish children in making their own life
choices. Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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antecedent to the explicit recognition of a constitutional zone of
"privacy." The Warren Court did much to find a constitutional home
for the concept of privacy, with its decisions such as Griswold v.
Connecticut,29 Eisenstadt v. Baird,30 and of course, Roe v. Wade.31 A
better word than "privacy" for the interest at stake in this line of
cases might be "autonomy."
Moreover, the Warren Court invented the notion of deriving a
fundamental rights strand from the Equal Protection Clause. Those
fundamental rights that it identified as deserving of special judicial
protection correspond quite closely with many of the personal choices
in areas of important individual control that comprehensive liberal-
ism protects: the right to travel, that is, to choose where one lives; 3
2
the right to equal access to the ballot;3  and the right to access to the
judicial process. 34 These are all important aspects of the overall
concept of autonomy, and they were all recognized by the Warren
Court as deserving of special protection under the Equal Protection
Clause. a5 This protection is not neutral as between values; it singles
out specific values that the state must respect because of their
particular role in the life of a citizen in a democratic society. And
with respect to means, the state must ensure that it does not
29. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a state law criminalizing the use of contraceptives).
30. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a state law criminalizing distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried people).
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating a state law criminalizing abortion).
32. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (striking down state waiting period
requirements designed to impede interstate movement).
33. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (declaring Virginia's
poll tax unconstitutional).
34. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that an Illinois law effectively
denying prisoners access to trial transcripts violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution).
35. Eventually, the Supreme Court called a halt to the identification of fundamental
rights in the Fourteenth Amendment. By the time the Court explicitly addressed the question
of education, which one would expect an autonomy-supporting court to recognize as a
fundamental right, its composition had changed so substantially that it can no longer be
meaningfully called the Warren Court. In San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), a majority of five justices concluded that education is not a
fundamental right. The majority comprised Justices Powell, Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, and
Rehnquist. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Douglas, and White dissented by reason of the
importance of education to the good life-the type of autonomy-driven analysis such as one
would expect from the authors of Brown. See notes 14-18 and accompanying text. For some
purposes it may be useful to say that the Warren Court lasted through the mid-1970s. For
example, I agree with Professor Sherry that Roe v. Wade should be so understood. For purposes
of characterizing Rodriguez, however, it does not make sense to attribute Warren Court
motivations to that group of Nixon appointees plus Justice Stewart, with the staunch Warren
Court members in dissent on the very point at issue, the importance of autonomy.
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differentiate among citizens with respect to fundamental rights be-
cause of their tremendous importance to all.
If anyone familiar with the literature were to offer an impres-
sionistic assessment of the Warren Court's jurisprudence, it is almost
unthinkable that such a person would suggest "state neutrality" as a
driving aspiration of that Court. Instead, I would venture to guess
that the Court's firm call for racial justice, coupled with its develop-
ment of the new constitutional recognition of rights to privacy and
fundamental interests, would lead such a Court-watcher to posit that
the soul of the Warren Court lay in its commitment to the value of
government accommodation of the individual.
The Rehnquist Court decisions in the same areas of law, by
contrast, display marked hostility to any state accommodation of
individual needs or interests. They manifest great fear that any con-
troversial societal ideal, including the ideal of individual autonomy,
should become the established orthodoxy of the state. This is remi-
niscent of the posture of political liberalism. Professor Sherry, I
think, accurately describes the Rehnquist Court cases in the areas of
affirmative action and hate speech as requiring the state to adopt a
strict position of formal neutrality with regard to all political values.
36
This credo requires the state to abandon accommodation of idiosyn-
cratic, that is, non-majority, beliefs or considerations. In such un-
mitigated government generality, the argument goes, lies the path to
greatest freedom from state-imposed orthodoxy. This is a radically
different commitment from that of the Warren Court.
The stark contrast can be seen by comparing Wisconsin v.
Yoder, the Warren Court compulsory education case, with
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith,3 7 a 1990 decision holding that a state may constitutionally
enforce its general ban on drugs against a person who smokes peyote
as a part of his Native American religion.38 In an opinion by Justice
Scalia, the Smith Court explained that because the state did not in-
tend to restrict religious freedom, it could constitutionally penalize
the religious conduct at issue as an incident to the general policy of
drug prohibition.39 Thus, the Rehnquist Court opted for a position of
state neutrality with respect to different life choices. All persons were
prohibited from ingesting peyote, and thus the state had no further
obligation. The Yoder Court, in contrast, had found that even though
36. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 467, 475 (cited in note 1).
37. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
38. Id. at 890.
39. Id. at 878.
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the state had had no intent to disadvantage Amish children with its
truancy law, it had an affirmative duty to accommodate their peculiar
religious demands by creating an exception to an otherwise general
law.40 The divergent results clearly illustrate the difference in the two
Courts' philosophical commitments regarding a state's obligation to
the individual.
The evidence is strong that the Warren Court adhered quite
consistently to the comprehensive-liberal ideal that assigns the state
the task of promoting individual fulfillment. The manifestatiorls of
this credo at times appear to be decisions of the political liberal, in
cases in which the two philosophies overlap. I think Professor Sherry
has mistakenly looked at these cases, in which both schools would
agree on the outcome, and has assumed that the political-liberal, as
opposed to the comprehensive-liberal, reasoning gave rise to them. As
a result, when she extrapolates to determine how the Warren Court
might have decided cases involving issues on which the two schools
would diverge, she predicts the wrong outcomes. Thus, for example,
Professor Sherry assumes that the rationale of Brown would give rise
to Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,41 finding the principle of racial
neutrality to underlie both decisions. If, however, one understands
Brown as a case about protecting an historically subordinate group
from being denied access to the means to an autonomous life in
society, then the result in Adarand (striking down minority
preferences in government contracting) does not follow at all. Indeed,
one might wonder if, for the Warren Court, the preferences at issue in
Adarand might not be seen simply as a further step along a
continuum toward the goal of achieving autonomous lives for citizens
historically and currently denied the means to flourish. For the
Warren Court, neutrality was a means; for the Rehnquist Court, neu-
trality is an end. For the Warren Court, neutrality was acceptable
under some circumstances; for the Rehnquist Court, neutrality is
essential always. Professor Sherry has invited us to look back at the
Warren Court's decisions through the lens of Rehnquist Court phi-
losophy. What we find by doing so misses the soul that animated the
earlier Court.
Although we have no actual indications of what the Warren
Court would have done with regard to affirmative action, it is possible
to extrapolate from its general philosophical position. As comprehen-
40. See notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
41. 115 S. Ct. 2097, 132 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1995).
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sive liberals rather than political liberals, the members of the Warren
Court would have had a powerful inclination to uphold affirmative
action. The state's duty to protect and endorse the value of individual
autonomy leads directly to an obligation on the state to lessen barri-
ers that may exist to the exercise of meaningful choice by its citizens.
The suggestion that all citizens alike may choose to go to college, for
example, rings hollow to the comprehensive liberal in the face of
evidence that entire groups will never attend college because of eco-
nomic, cultural, and circumstantial impediments to matriculation.
This brief Comment is not the place to make the complete argument
in favor of affirmative action from the perspective of the
comprehensive liberal, but I think the very definition of that school of
thought directly gives rise to the case that could be made. Thus, it is
a mistake to believe that the occasional bows to neutrality in the
Warren Court's jurisprudence suggest anything like the type of severe
restriction that the Rehnquist Court has imposed on state attempts to
achieve racial justice.
The other issue that Professor Sherry raises is hate speech.
This presents a very difficult legal question, especially for liberals of
any stripe, and I am not entirely comfortable claiming to know what
the Warren Court would have done if it had faced the constitutional-
ity of a law restricting speech on the basis of its racist content. For
me, however, it is a bit too glib to claim that just because that Court
prohibited the suppression of the "Fuck the Draft" message in Cohen
v. California42 it would also necessarily have prohibited the suppres-
sion of hate speech. Professor Sherry notes that the Court in Cohen
stated that "one man's vulgarity is another man's lyric."43 But in my
view, the mere vulgarity at issue in Cohen should not necessarily be
equated with the speech at issue in more recent hate speech cases
involving the personal debasement of intimidation and condemnation
on the basis of race. 44 The two types of "offense" that one might take
42. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
43. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 470 (cited in note 1) (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25
(1971)).
44. See, for example, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992)
(striking down an ordinance outlawing speech that caused "anger, alarm, or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender"). In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969), the Warren Court did consider a state effort to suppress the racist speech
expressed at a Ku Klux Klan rally. The case does not provide insight into the question of the
Court's attitude toward "hate speech" as that term has been used in the 1990s, however,
because the restriction at issue did not seek to protect autonomy-based values. Rather, the
statute at issue outlawed the advocacy of "the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage,
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
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are fundamentally different from the perspective of the
comprehensive-liberal commitment to personal autonomy. The sight
of a vulgar word that may offend societal etiquette is not a threat to
the essence of any individual or to the security of one's place in
society. But being called worthless as a human being because of a
personal characteristic over which one has no control has a far more
insidious effect in negating the very value that the comprehensive-
liberal state seeks to promote-human flourishing through self-ful-
fillment.
I offer a skeletal argument on behalf of those who might guess
that the Warren Court would have tolerated the suppression of hate
speech. As I have discussed above, 4s comprehensive liberalism holds
that the state has a duty to counter constraints on autonomy, even if
generated by private elements of society. It must promote the goal of
individual choice without endorsing a particular point of view on the
topic in question. In the area of speech, the value of autonomy has
often been discussed only from the perspective of the autonomy of
speakers, a perspective that leads to prohibition of most forms of
regulation. But because an individual citizen's capacity for autonomy
in society is as much affected by the range of opinions to which she is
exposed as it is by what she may herself say, some suggest that the
autonomy analysis ought to focus more on the autonomy of hearers as
distinct from that of speakers. 46 Individuals develop the capacity to
make meaningful and informed choices about the important issues in
their lives in part by being exposed to reasoned argument. Thus,
speech that does not invoke or invite reason but instead by denigra-
tion tends to corrupt the development of a "public culture" within
which the nature and quality of opportunities in society can be rea-
sonably determined,47 may well be seen as the type of impediment to
autonomy that the state has the right and the duty to protect against.
Of course, it is possible that the Warren Court would have
gone the other way, striking down such hate speech regulations as
impermissible, content-based restrictions. One could imagine an
argument, still consistent with the Warren Court's comprehensive-
reform." Id. at 444-45. Thus, the issue was neither framed, nor probably even conceived of, as
the validity of a state's effort to protect autonomy.
45. See Part I.
46. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Market, 82 Geo. L. J.
373, 380-82 (1993).
47. See Joseph Raz, Liberalism, Skepticism, and Democracy, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 761, 783
(1989) (identifying the importance of the environment in evaluating autonomy).
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liberal leanings, to the effect that the autonomy of all speakers and
hearers of speech is enhanced by unconstrained discussion of all
kinds. But my goal is simply to suggest that that result is far from
"obvious." Indeed, if one engages in a fair analysis of actual indica-
tions of the Court's political theory, one might well find that the ex-
trapolation points in the opposite direction.
III.
It seems to me that Professor Sherry's paper falls into a trap
that has also captured the Rehnquist Court itself. That trap is the
overly abstract and formal interpretation of prior cases. The only way
for a legal scholar to accept the facially bizarre notion that the
Warren and Rehnquist Courts share the same view of racial justice is
to pluck holdings, sentences, or paragraphs from their contexts and
assign them new meaning. Only in such a way can one say that
Brown should now be understood to proscribe all race-based
distinctions. I am heartened by the sociological phenomenon that
Professor Sherry describes in her Article: that constitutional scholars
do not readily see her suggested equation between the two Courts.48
What that tells me is that most of us do not favor such formalistic,
acontextual readings of prior decisions, and perhaps we expect our
judges to do a better job of giving meaningful interpretation to the
texts before them as well.
It is especially important to look at meaning and context when
examining claims to neutrality. Neutrality is a concept that is de-
fined, at least to some degree, by what it displaces. For the Warren
Court, state neutrality in race cases was a step away from official
oppression intentionally designed to harm and subordinate people of
color. As between those two choices, neutrality was clearly the alter-
native more likely to advance the state toward racial justice-but to
the Warren Court it was always racial justice, and not neutrality, that
was the end. Neutrality, as opposed to state-imposed segregation,
was simply a means to get to that end.
In contrast, the state neutrality that the Rehnquist Court has
mandated is an alternative not to intentional harm of an entire race,
but to efforts to increase the meaningful choices of racial minorities.
Although the characteristic of race neutrality may be identified here,
it cannot be understood as the same principle that the Warren Court
48. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 459, 476 (cited in note 1).
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employed. For the Rehnquist Court, neutrality is itself an end-an
absolute limitation on state action-rather than a means to achieve
racial justice. Indeed, the Court has effectively told us that racial
injustices are a cost we must bear for the sake of state neutrality.
49 If
there is any connection for this Court between the principle of race
neutrality and that of racial justice, it is simply a definitional one
such as that offered by Professor Sherry: "fairness presumptively
requires racial neutrality."50 For the Rehnquist Court, state neutral-
ity is not something to be accepted only if it promotes other objectives;
it is to be embraced, period.
Thus, the two Courts have very different visions of the role of
neutrality in social ordering. A commitment to requiring neutrality in
place of intentional evil is simply not the same thing as a commitment
to requiring neutrality in place of intended good. Indeed, the moral
defensibility of neutrality, which Professor Sherry simply assumes
was recognized by both Courts, is not self-evident. Switzerland and
the Vatican, for example, have been passionately criticized for re-
maining "neutral" in the face of the Nazi Holocaust. The famous
sardonic claim that rich people as well as beggars are forbidden from
sleeping under bridges; the fatal error in Marie Antoinette's "let them
eat cake" remark-all suggest a moral queasiness that many people
feel about a strict neutrality principle divorced from the consequences
of its application. It may be possible to construct a justification for
state neutrality in the face of horrendous discrepancies in the abilities
of citizens to flourish in society. But such a justification would take
much more than a mere invocation of kindergarten etiquette.
An important ramification of the divergence between the po-
litical-liberal and comprehensive-liberal visions lies in their respective
tolerance for societal injustice created or perpetuated by forces other
than current state policy itself. Political liberalism's formal
neutrality would suggest that existing discrepancies in societal bene-
fits must be tolerated. In this respect, the Rehnquist Court can fairly
be labeled "conservative," in that it conserves the social order. In
contrast, the autonomy principle central to comprehensive liberalism
would suggest that the state must critically examine the status quo to
discover fundamental injustices or other impediments to human ful-
49. See, for example, Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2109 ("Societal discrimination, without more,
is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy.") (quoting Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
50. Sherry, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 485 (cited in note 1).
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fillment, and that it must take steps to compensate for such impedi-
ments. The baseline of the autonomy principle is normative, not posi-
tive, and in this respect may fairly be called "liberal."
Professor Sherry suggests that fairness cannot exist without
formal neutrality.51 The truth of that statement depends on whether
one has confidence that the status quo, toward which the state re-
mains neutral, is itself fair. If one has concerns about the fairness of
the status quo, one should also be concerned about efforts to perpetu-
ate it through the vehicle of state neutrality. Whatever else one may
say about postmodernism, that message from critical scholarship is a
powerful one.
I cannot lay to rest the profound question of whether
comprehensive liberalism or political liberalism has captured the
better vision of the good. But I can say that the affirmative case for
the comprehensive-liberal ideal of fulfillment of individual potential
through autonomous choice is a plausible contender and should not be
dismissed as unenlightened, arbitrary, unfair, or irrational. The
Warren Court made a good start toward attainment of that ideal,
accomplishing a level of progress that the Rehnquist Court has not
carried forward. The philosophical stances of the two Courts on these
issues have deservedly attracted the contrasting names "liberal" and
"conservative," respectively-labels that will stick, despite Professor
Sherry's dogged efforts to dislodge them.
51. Id.
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